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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN 
ana BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
BAILEY BIRD ana 
VIRGINIA BIRD, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 16416 & 16397 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants brought this action to obtain a declara-
tion of their rights, as lessees, under a lease of a commer-
cial building ana adjoined parking areas, to re-arrange and 
control configurations of parking; respondents, lessors, 
counterclaimed seeking a aeclaration that the lease contem-
plates human occupancy of the building involved, and requires 
appellants to improve the builaing for that purpose. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the 
lease required appellants to make, prior to the renewal date 
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of the lease in lYBl, at least basic improvements to the 
leasehold, including the installation of heating and cooling, 
lighting, electrical, and plumbing systems, ana certain 
structural repairs, admitting evidence regarding the negotia-
tion of the lease, from which it concluded that use of the 
building for gymnasium and/or lodging facilities was intended 
by the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The lease in question (Exhibit 1), was entered into 
November 21, 1961. It covers the second and third floors of 
a large building at 251-253 East Second South Street, Salt 
Lake City, together with a substantial parking area to the 
rear. It provides an initial term of 10 years, renewable 
twice for additional ten year terms. The original rent is 
$350.00 monthly, to be aajusted at the end of the second 
term. The lease is in its second term, which expires 
November 11, 1981. 
Appellants own adjoining property in the same 
block, in which they operate the Townhouse Athletic Club and 
related businesses. Appellants' Townhouse building is joined 
to the building leased from respondents by the parking area 
leased from respondents. Appellants and respondents' other 
tenants use the parking area in common. Except for minimal 
after hours parking in the vicinity, appellants have no other 
parking for their Townhouse business except that leasea fr~ 
respondents. Appellants have, in fact, extenaed the Town-
-2-
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house facilities so that they extend into the leased parking 
area. 
The lease was negotiated by Mr. Stevenson and Mr. 
Bird, and their attorneys, Mr. Hanni representing appellants 
and Mr. Tibbles representing respondents. The lease in its 
final form was drafted by Mr. Hanni. (R. 342 et~.) 
At the time of the lease, the upper floor of the 
leased building had been recently gutted by fire. These 
floors were in need of appropriate structural repairs, 
together with installation of heating and cooling, electri-
cal, and plumbing systems to make them tenantable. (R. 339 
et ~·) Mr. Stevenson inspected the premises, and these 
matters were called to his attention, because he had repre-
sented that he intended to devote the two floors to use by 
his patrons in connection with the Townhouse Athletic Club. 
(R. 326 et~·) 
Mr. Stevenson plainly stated that he wished to 
"tie-up" the space in Mr. Bird's building for future expan-
sion of the Townhouse Club. (Id.) He had numerous alterna-
tives for the type of facilities he might construct in Mr. 
Bird's building for use by his patrons. He wished the lan-
guage of the lease left broad enough to permit him a choice 
between these alternatives. (R. 346-47). Among the alterna-
tives discussed were various athletic facilities and rooms 
for lodging. Mr. Stevenson indicated that he might wish to 
-3-
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construct a causeway, at the second floor level, between his 
building and Mr. Biro's. (R. 326 ~ ~.) 
Mr. Stevenson never intimated that he would leave 
Mr. Bird's building entirely vacant, except for storage of 
excess supplies and materials, and that alternative was never 
discussed. (R. 339 ~ ~·) 
Since any of the uses proposed by Mr. Stevenson 
required extensive improvement of Mr. Biro's building, the 
lease was made to provide that improvements woulo accede to 
the lessor, and lessee would be given a long, renewing term 
at low rent in which to amortize these improvements. At the 
end of 20 years, lessee would be permitted a third ten year 
term, but at an adjusted rental reflecting the value of the 
builoing as improveo. (.!2,.) 
In fact, appellants have never used respondents' 
builaing for anything but storage. While they have carried 
out extensive additions and improvements to their own build-
ings, they have made no improvements in respondents' buila-
ings. They now refuse to make any improvements to respon-
aents' building. 
In 1973, respondents sued appellants to cancel the 
lease, asserting that appellants had failed to take the steps 
necessary to renew the lease, and that the use then being 
made ot the building by appellants had allowed the building 
to fall into a condition not permitted by the lease. The 
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Court, in Bird v~ Stevenson, Civ. No. 206422, Third District 
Court of Utah (1973), declined to cancel the lease. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Lease Requires The. Making Of 
"Necessary Improvements." 
The lease by its plain terms requires the making of 
certain improvements understood by all parties to be neces-
sary to make the premises tenantable. 
The lease recites, on page 1, that the two upper 
floors of the leased building "are in need of repair and the 
installation of heating equipment to make the said floors 
tenantable." Paragraph 2 of the lease provides that "Lessee 
shall make all improvements necessary or desired by lessee to 
the second and third floor of the said building at 251-253 
East Second South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, including 
the furnishing of any heating facilities, lighting facili-
ties and building structural repairs," and that "such im-
provements shall become the property of the lessor, including 
the heating facilities installed by lessee and all lighting 
fixtures, plumbing or other fixtures so installed by lessee, 
upon the termination of said lease or any extension thereof." 
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 6 of the lease requires lessee 
to pay all increased taxes due to his improvements. 1 
16. Lessee further covenants and agrees that in 
addition to payment of the rentals and making available of 
parking stalls hereinabove provided, Lessee shall pay any 
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Paragraph 9(f) assumes that the premises will be improved 
by lessee, and requires that lessee leave the premises in 
their improved condition upon termination of the lease.2 
Paragraph 15 assumes that such improvements as are 
necessary to make the premises tenantable will be made, since 
it treats the possibility of the premises becoming 
untenantable thereafter.3 
Paragraph l(a) requires that the rent on the 
premises be renegotiated prior to the commencement of any 
third term, in view of "changed conditions" brought about 
(fn. 1 cont.) and all additional taxes levied upon the 
said premises by reason of any improvements made by Lessee 
including any increase in the general property taxes levied 
by Salt Lake County, said increase in property taxes to be 
determined based solely upon increased valuation by reason of 
Lessee's improvements. Lessee shall not be responsible for 
any increase in taxes resulting solely from an increase in 
the amount of the levy. 
29. Lessee further covenants and agrees with Lessors as 
follows: 
(f) Upon termination of this lease to leave the 
demised premises in their improved condition with all im-
provements in place that have been made thereon by Lessee. 
Lessee shall have the right to remove any furniture or . 
personal property of his from the demised premises including 
the second and third floors of the building at 251 East 2nd 
South. 
315. If the building at 251-253 East 2nd South is so 
damaged or destroyed by whatever means, except by ~he act of 
Lessee, as to thereby be rendered untenantable during the 
term of this lease, then in such event the rentals payable 
hereunder, shall be reduced to the sum of $100.00 per mon~h 
from the date the same becomes untenantable to and including 
the first day that it shall again become tenantable. 
-6-
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during the first two terms. Such a provision is commonplace 
in such commercial leases: it allows the lessor to take 
advantage of the benefit of his bargain, the improvements 
constructed by lessee, by increasing the rent to reflect the 
building's improved state. 
While the obligation of the lessee to make 
improvements under this lease is contained principally within 
paragraph 2, the lease is to be construed as a whole, and the 
District Court properly referred to the additional provisions 
cited above in making its ruling. In using these other 
provisions to interpret and construe the contract the court 
(1) gave meaning to the intent of the parties, (2) inter-
preted the document consistently with its other provisions, 
(3) made effective upon the Stevensens an obligation clearly 
intended and (4) produced a more fair and equitable result. 
In so doing the trial court, on each of the four points, 
followed this Court's clearly enunciated standards for 
contract interpretation and construction. Waverly Oil Works 
Company v. R.B. Epperson, 105 Utah 553, 144 P.2d 286 (1943); 
Driggs v. Utah State leachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 
142 P.2d 657 (1943); Ross. v. Producers Mutual Insurance 
Company, 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339 (1956); Plain. City 
Irrigation Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 
P.2d 625 (1960); Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976); 
Mark steel Corp. v. Eimco, 548 P.2d 892 (Utah 1976); Thomas 
-7-
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J, Peck. & Sons, Inc. v. Lee. Rock Products,. Inc., 30 Utah 2d 
187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973). 
The term "tenantable," as used in conveyances of 
commercial properties, such as this lease, has a fixed and 
known meaning. It means fit for human occupancy for the 
commercial purposes intended. ~' Wolff v. Turner, 65 S.E. 
41 (Ga. App. 1909); Acme Gro.uno. Rent Co .• v .• Werner, 139 N.w. 
314 (Wis. 1912); Louis. v. Ada. Lodge No. 3, Inoependent Order 
of Odd Fellows, 254 P.2d 1095 (Idaho 1956); Mottman 
Merchantile Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 100 P.2d 16 
(Wash. 1940). There can be no serious question that the pre-
sent lease intends lessee to make the building tenantable, or 
that certain improvements - heating and cooling, electrical, 
plumbing, structural repair of fire damage - were agreed to 
be necessary for that purpose. The only question that arises 
is not whether the building should be made fit for human 
occupancy, but what form of human occupancy was contemplated, 
given the alternatives discussed at the time of making the 
lease. That question arises only because appellants 
requested that the lease not bind them to a specific choice, 
representing that they would choose in due course from among 
the alternatives proposed. 
Against this plain language of the lease, appel-
lants interpose only the observation that paragraph 2 pro-
vides that lessee "shall make all improvements necessary 9E 
-8-
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desired by lessee." Appellants read this language as if the 
phrase were "necessary~ or aesired by lessee"; as if, in 
tact, lessee were the arbiter of what was necessary as well 
as what he desired. The actual language aoes not comport 
with appellants' reading, and the reading does not account 
for the immediately iollowing provisions that the "necessary 
or desired" improvements are "including the furnishing of any 
heating facilities, lighting facilities and builaing struc-
tural repairs", and that "such improvements shall become the 
property of the lessors, including the heating facilities 
installed by Lessee and all lighting fixtures, plumbing or 
other fixtures so installea by lessee." Plainly, lessee does 
not have aiscretion about the "necessary improvements". They 
are as enumerated: heating and cooling, plumbing, electrical 
and structural repairs. It is immaterial on this appeal that 
lessee may have discretion about "aesired" improvements: the 
judgment here is for the necessary improvements only. 
Appellants' argument that the purpose of paragraph 
2 is the negative one "to emphasize that Bird was not respon-
sible to make (improvements)" is specious. Paragraph 4 
specifically provides that lessor shall not be responsible 
tor improvements. 
Point II. The Court Properly Admitted Testimony 
Regaraing Negotiations For The Lease. 
The District Court's interpretation of the language 
ot the lease regarding necessary improvements is fully justi-
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fied without resort to other evidence. It is also supported 
by evidence admitted by the Court regarding the negotiation 
of the lease. 
Appellants object to the admission of evidence of 
the negotiations of the parties for the lease, on the ground 
that it was parol proffered for the purpose of varying the 
terms of the agreement. The evidence was neither proffered 
nor admitted for such purposes. 
In the main, the evidence was offered for the 
purpose of showing the types of human occupancy discussed by 
the parties in the negotiations. The purpose was not to 
alter the requirement of the lease regarding making the 
premises tenantable, but to show the kinds of tenancies 
contemplated. The Court heard evidence regarding discussion 
of use of the premises by lessees' Townhouse Athletic Club 
patrons for various athletic endeavors and for lodging, and 
the entire lack of discussion of the possibility that the 
premises would not be used for human occupancy. 
The Court was entitled to admit this evidence both 
for the purpose of disposing of appellants' claim that the 
language of the lease was intended to permit them an option 
whether to improve the premises, and to clarify the question, 
created by appellants' request that the lease not limit them 
to a specific kind of occupancy, of the purposes for which 
improvements were required by the lease. Such evidence is 
always permissible for the purpose of clarifying the terms of 
-10-
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an agreement if the Court entertains any uncertainty about 
them. See Russell v. Park City Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (Utah 
1976); Ewell & Sons, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp, 27 U.2d 
188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Stewart, 4 U.2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955). 
POINT III. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That 
The Necessary Improvements Must Be Completed On Or Before 
1981. 
Appellants very briefly argue (page 5 of appel-
lants' brief) that the trial court erred when it held that 
appellants must make the improvements before the 1981 
expiration date of the first ten year renewal term of the 
lease. Appellants assert that, since they might renew the 
lease in 1981, any obligation to improve the premises would 
not arise until the expiration of the second ten year option 
term of the lease in 1991. 
The argument is misleading because plaintiffs can, 
of course, choose not to renew the lease. Thus, they would 
attempt to escape completely from the clearly imposed duty to 
make improvements to the premises. In fact, the improvements 
are required to be _in place at any time the lease is 
terminated (or lessors would have a claim for the value of 
those not done), and in no case later than November 11, 1981, 
at which time the lease is to terminate or continue with the 
rent adjusted upward in view of the improved conaition of the 
premises. 
-11-
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In concluding that the lease requires the necessary 
improvements to be completed by the end of the first ten year 
option period in 1981, the court specifically referred to 
paragraph l(b) which provides for the second ten year renewal 
of the lease. This provision states that for the second 
option period a new rent will be either agreed upon or 
arbitrated, with the new rent to be based upon the state of 
the premises. The court drew from these provisions the 
reasonable conclusion that the parties contemplated that the 
required improvements would be made prior to the 1981 
expiration date. As the court summarized its ruling: 
(I)t was recognized by the parties at 
the time that they would take a look at 
the facilities and what fair rental would 
be, and if they couldn't agree, they had 
an arbitration set forth in that lease as 
to what rental properties would be. And 
it appears to me that it was contemplated 
that those rooms being finished at least 
by the end of the second ten year period 
would be taken into consideration. (R. 
372). 
Point IV. Lessor's Counterclaim Is Not Barred 
By Res Judicata. 
Since the improvements necessary or desirable to 
make are not due to be turned over to lessor until 
termination of the lease, it would be permissible, though 
apparently not anticipated, for lessee to postpone making the 
improvements for some part of the first twenty years (the 
first two ten-year terms) so long as he keeps the lease in 
effect, intends to make the improvements, and leaves time to 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do so before the end of the second ten years. At that point, 
paragraph 1 comes into play. It requires that the rent be 
renegotiated upon commencement of the third ten-year term in 
view of changes that have come about. Chief of such changes 
that would require renegotiation of the rent would be, of 
course, improvements enhancing the value of the building. 
Paragraph 1 therefore contemplates that the "necessary" 
improvements be completed before renegotiation of the rent at 
the commencement of the third term of the lease. 
The plain intent is that, at the end of the first 
two terms, the lessor have a building tenantable as a public 
commercial space, and that lessee thereupon commence paying 
rent accordingly. 
Regardless of the year in which the lease is 
terminated, upon termination the "necessary" improvements and 
any "desired" improvements actually constructed, are due to 
be turned over to the lessor. If the "necessary" 
improvements have not been completed, the lessor would be 
entitlea to tneir value in aamages. 
Lessor's counterclaim asserts his right to the 
"necessary" improvements of heating and cooling, lighting ana 
electrical, plumbing, and structural repairs. These are 
required to be made by November 21, 1981, the commencement of 
the third ten-year term of the lease. 
Plaintiff's only response to this claim is an 
assertion that the matter has been adversely decided in ~ 
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v. Stevensen, supra, and that judgment therein is res judi-
cata herein. The Order in that case has no effect upon the 
lessor's right to relief in this. 
The Order in the earlier case first finds that the 
lease had been renewed, and that, as of the date of the 
Order, lessee's uses of the second and third floors of the 
demised building had not created a condition forebiaden by 
the lease. At that time, lessee had made no improvements to 
the building. Lessee apparently now reaas this ruling as one 
that no improvements are ever aue. In fact, to the extent it 
bears upon the question of improvements at all, it is merely 
one that, the lease having been renewed rather than terminat-
ed, no improvements were then due to be turned over to 
lessor, so that lessee's failure then to have constructed any 
improvements was not a violation of the lease. The ruling 
effectively gave lessee the remainder of the renewal term in 
which to make improvements. 
The earlier action did not involve the question 
presented here of whether upon termination of the lease, or 
at the outset of the third term, the specified improvements 
were due. Nothing in the ruling on the question ~osed by the 
earlier case implies any conflict with the ruling on the 
question posed by the later case: both find that 
improvements are not due to be constructed while the lease 
remains in effect during the first two terms. 
-14- I j 
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Specifically, lessee relies upon a single conclu-
sion of law in the earlier matter. There Judge Gordon R. 
Hall found that: 
2. The written lease does not require 
any conditions, use, maintenance or 
repairs in regard to said second and 
third floors of said building different 
from the use defendant is presently 
making of said floors. (Conclusion of 
Law 2 in Civil No. 206422) (Ex. 15). 
This language specifically refers to "present" use, and 
has no bearing upon ultimate duty. 
This conclusion is strengthened by a reading of the 
additional conclusions of law and findings of fact found in 
Exhibit 15. In the eight findings of fact no reference is 
made to any duty to make improvements; indeed, all eight of 
the findings refer specifically to uses made of the premises 
during the period prior to the entry of those findings. 
The same is true of the four conclusions of law. 
None of them refers to any duty to improve the premises. All 
references are to past uses of the premises. 
Thus, res judicata is not applicable under the rule 
stated in East Millcreek Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 
Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945), As this Court stated: 
"This action does not involve the same 
claim, demand or cause of action tba~ was 
litigated in the former action. It does 
involve the interpretation of the same 
contract, but the question to be deter-
mined in the two actions are different, 
the provisions governing in this case are 
different from those governing in the 
former case. In fact the provisions 
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governing this case had not become effec-
tive at the time the other case was 
tried. and in view of the fact that there 
was not nor could there have been any 
bona fide dispute on the interpretation 
of such provisions. (159 P.2d at 866) 
(Emphasis added). See also Leone v. 
Zuniga, 84 Utah 419, 34 P.2d 699 (1934). 
The relief sought in the earlier action was to 
have the lease cancelled and damages assessed because lessee 
had failed to mail the proper notice required to renew at ~e 
end of the first ten-year term. Lessee had apparently mailed 
the notice late and had continued to pay rent, and the 
defense was that lessor had not been damaged, while 
cancellation of the lease would deprive lessee of property 
crucial to the conduct of his business. The Court in balanc-
ing the equities appears to have ruled that the damage to a 
substantial business, together with the imposition of 
damages, was a consequence to lessee that far outweighed the 
consequences to lessor, late receipt of the notice of 
renewal. Lessee takes this ruling as one that he may now 
avoid his chief responsibility under the lease, regardless of 
consequences to the lessor. 
The lease in this case sets a low rent, with a 
long, renewing term, so that lessee can construct the 
improvements needed by lessor, and can amortize their costs 
over a substantial time. In exchange for having let the 
property for a low rent for twenty years, the lessor gets 
certain improvements, with an increased rental during the 
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third ten-year term. Lessee wishes the lease to be read to 
permit lessee to pay the same low rental throughout the 
entire thirty years, and to avoid entirely the making of any 
improvements. ~ 
In fact, lessee has had eighteen years use of the 
leased building in which he could have amortized the needed 
improvements, but in which he has paid nothing. If he is 
permitted to renew for a third term, he will have an 
additional twelve years in which to amortize the improvements 
required. In either case, there is certainly nothing unfair 
or onerous in requiring him, by the end of the first twenty 
years of the lease, to have made the necessary improvements, 
or to have paid their value to lessor, in order to keep the 
lease in effect. On the other hand, to refuse to enforce the 
plain language of the lease in lessor's behalf permits lessee 
to defraud lessor, and will result in imposing upon lessor 
for thirty years an extremely bad bargain as to rental, at 
the end of which lessor will be given back a once valuable 
building now rendered wholly useless. Obviously, the balance 
of equities at this time has become entirely reversed from 
the situation which existed at the time of the earlier 
trial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Lessee in this case asserts extremely strained 
readings of the lease and an earlier ruling of the District 
Court in order to avoid his chief obligation under the lease. 
-17-
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The District Court quite properly rejected this attempt. 
None of appellants' objections to the ruling below have 
merit. The ruling should be affirmed. 
DATED this ~'~-day of,~'.--'-"------', 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
By~~~-'-_.,...~-"~~~~~ 
E. Craig Smay 
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Attorneys for Defendants-
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